

BULLETIN

DE L'ASSOCIATION POUR L'ETUDE
DE L'OEUVRE D'HENRI DE MAN

Nº. 8 — Décembre 1978

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Place de l'Université 3, 1211 GENEVE 4 (Suisse)

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de l'Association ou de son secrétariat. Ils n'engagent que la
responsabilité de leur auteur.*

MESSAGE DU PRÉSIDENT

C'est pour moi un privilège d'adresser ces quelques mots aux membres de l'Association dont j'ai l'honneur d'assurer la présidence depuis la dernière assemblée générale.

J'ai conscience, tout d'abord, de la lourde responsabilité qui m'incombe en prenant la succession de notre premier président, M. Jef Rens.

Sans lui, l'Association n'avait pas grandes chances de survie. En une période où tout le monde semble surchargé de travail, M. Rens aurait pu lui-même invoquer ses nombreuses fonctions pour décliner l'appel qui lui était fait. Il l'a néanmoins accepté et n'a pas ménagé ses efforts pour le développement de l'Association. Animé par le souvenir chaleureux de la personnalité d'Henri de Man et convaincu que l'oeuvre de celui-ci revêt une singulière actualité, il a mérité notre gratitude pour son incessante activité.

Notre Association n'est certes pas une organisation de taille impressionnante. Le nombre de ses adhérents est encore restreint, sa structure très simple. Elle aspire à être un point de rassemblement, d'information et de stimulation des activités, plutôt qu'à tout entreprendre par elle-même. Elle n'en a pas moins ses activités propres et, comme il se doit, plus de projets qu'elle n'a pu en réaliser jusqu'ici. Ce Bulletin, qui sert de liaison entre les membres et s'est fait régulièrement l'écho de ces réalisations, me dispense d'en faire le bilan ; mais je voudrais saisir cette occasion de dire que nous sommes heureux d'avoir en Michel Brélaz un secrétaire général si actif et dévoué. Par ailleurs, chacun espère que le colloque de Genève, qui fut à l'origine en 1973 de la création de l'Association, aura bientôt un successeur.

Néanmoins, les dimensions modestes de notre entreprise font que sa position reste fragile. C'est ce qui doit mobiliser notre attention et nous inciter à réfléchir tant aux structures qu'aux perspectives de l'Association. Si nous voulons lui assurer une existence durable, l'accent devra être mis sur l'accroissement du nombre des membres et notamment sur le recrutement parmi la jeune génération. L'âge moyen de nos membres est en effet relativement élevé. Cela s'explique sans peine si l'on songe que beaucoup d'entre eux ont commencé à s'intéresser aux idées d'Henri de Man du vivant de celui-ci. Après la guerre, quelques jeunes s'y intéressèrent à leur tour pour des raisons plus ou moins fortuites. Mais aujourd'hui la pensée d'Henri de Man s'impose à nouveau comme sujet d'études, soit à un point de vue purement historique, soit parce que l'on redécouvre peu à peu la signification qu'elle revêt pour les sciences sociales ou dans le domaine politique. Cela est le cas surtout en Belgique ; mais on perçoit aussi un renouveau d'intérêt dans d'autres pays, notamment en Allemagne où existent des ouvertures que nous devons explorer.

Les tâches de l'Association découlent logiquement de ce que je viens de dire d'Henri de Man comme "sujet d'études" intéressant aussi bien l'historien que les représentants des sciences sociales et du monde politique. Il importe tout d'abord que l'œuvre soit lue et connue. Par la parole et par la plume, nous devons saisir toute occasion utile de lutter contre l'ignorance et la conspiration du silence. Nous devons nous attacher aux possibilités de faire publier l'œuvre, par exemple sous forme d'anthologies ou de textes choisis en fonction de thèmes appropriés aux circonstances.

Je voudrais souligner ici quelques préoccupations d'Henri de Man qui me paraissent particulièrement dignes d'être reconsidérées en fonction de notre actualité :

- a) le déplacement des mobiles (toujours possible et à observer soigneusement) dans les tendances sociales et politiques ; songeons par exemple au rôle du ressentiment social , de la motivation obtenue à l'aide de symboles sociaux blancs-noirs , de modèles jouant sur des réactions émotives voire fanatisantes , du conformisme et de la manipulation des masses , de l'angoisse comme motif social , de la solidarité concrète ;
- b) les racines de la mentalité socialiste : prise de conscience de l'arrière-fond culturel et moral à une époque qui connaît mal son histoire et fait montre d'un pragmatisme au jour le jour ;
- c) les perspectives d'avenir : la transition de la société du bien-être (qui présuppose la croissance économique et technologique) à une société de pénurie globale et de restriction aux possibilités réelles, ainsi que les réactions humaines à ces perspectives.

Ces brèves indications peuvent suffire à notre esquisse de l'avenir. A nous maintenant de rassembler les intéressés et d'élargir le cercle de nos activités.

Adriaan M. van Peski

HENRI DE MAN ET LES MANUSCRITS DE 1844

On lira ci-après la version anglaise inédite de l'article intitulé *Der neu entdeckte Marx* qu'Henri de Man consacra aux manuscrits économiques et politiques de Karl Marx publiés au début de 1932.

Le comité de l'Association aurait souhaité publier dans le Bulletin non seulement cette version anglaise, mais également la version française et le texte original allemand.

Pour des raisons pratiques, le secrétariat a dû adopter une solution un peu différente. Il ne lui était en effet pas possible de publier simultanément les trois textes et il ne lui a pas paru souhaitable d'étaler la publication sur deux ou trois numéros. Un choix a dû être fait.

On trouvera donc ci-après la version anglaise de *Der neu entdeckte Marx*, précédée d'une introduction de Jef Rens. Le texte original allemand et la traduction française feront l'objet d'un tirage séparé sous la forme d'une brochure bilingue, comprenant également l'introduction de Jef Rens.

Cette brochure sera envoyée gratuitement dès sa parution - postérieure à celle du présent Bulletin - aux membres de l'Association. D'autres exemplaires seront envoyés sur commande adressée au secrétariat à toute personne intéressée, moyennant paiement des frais.

JEF RENS

INTRODUCTION

En mai et juin 1932, Henri de Man publia dans la revue socialiste autrichienne *Der Kampf* une étude qu'il intitula "Der neu entdeckte Marx", titre qu'il est malaisé de traduire en français. Il s'agit d'une analyse fouillée d'un manuscrit que, selon S. Landshut et J. P. Mayer (1), Marx rédigea probablement à Paris entre la fin du mois de février et la fin du mois d'août 1844. Il avait alors 26 ans. Toutefois, d'après les mêmes présentateurs, la genèse des idées exposées dans le manuscrit est bien antérieure à ces dates et se situerait entre les mois d'avril 1841 et 1842, alors que Marx séjournait dans sa famille à Trèves (2). Par contre, D. Riazanov (3) place l'origine des manuscrits - il emploie le pluriel (4) - à Kreuznach, en juillet et août 1843.

Quelle que soit la date à laquelle ils furent conçus, il est pour le moins surprenant qu'il ait fallu plus de quarante ans après la mort de Karl Marx en 1883 pour qu'on les retrouve dans les archives du parti social-démocrate allemand. Dans leur préface, S. Landshut et J. P. Mayer citent un article de ce dernier, paru en 1931 dans la *Rote Revue* (Zurich), où l'existence du manuscrit est signalée, d'après cet auteur, pour la première fois. V. Adoratski, qui a écrit l'introduction du troisième volume (1932) de la première partie des *Oeuvres complètes de Marx et Engels* (MEGA), fait état d'une publication des

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- (1). Karl Marx. *Der historische Materialismus. Die Frühschriften*. Herausgegeben von S. Landshut und J. P. Mayer. Albert Kröner Verlag, Leipzig, 1932. Voir la préface à ce manuscrit, signée par Landshut et Mayer, p. 284.
 - (2). S. Landshut et J. P. Mayer, "Einleitung der Herausgeber", in *op. cit.*, p. XIX.
 - (3). Voir l'introduction de Riazanov in Karl Marx / Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe* (ci-après MEGA), erste Abteilung, Band 1, zweiter Halbband, Berlin, 1929, p. XXV.
 - (4). Riazanov emploie le pluriel, alors que Landshut et Mayer parlent tantôt de "Schrift", tantôt de "Manuskript", mais toujours au singulier. De Man a adopté l'usage de Riazanov. Nous emploierons indifféremment l'un ou l'autre.

manuscrits en langue russe en 1927 à Moscou (5). Riazanov fut sans doute responsable de cette publication, comme il le fut de l'introduction générale de la MEGA, parue dans le premier volume de la première partie. Il n'en était plus de même du troisième volume de la première partie, sur lequel Henri de Man s'est appuyé pour écrire son article, puisque Riazanov disparut entre la publication du deuxième volume (1930) et du troisième volume (1932) (6).

Je n'avais personnellement pas bien compris les raisons pour lesquelles de Man a préféré la version de la MEGA à celle de Landshut et Mayer, et je mentionne à cet égard Victor Leemans qui considère la version de ces derniers comme plus authentique (7). Pour justifier sa préférence, de Man invoque en faveur du texte de l'Institut Marx-Engels "sa meilleure articulation et le fait d'appartenir à la seule édition des oeuvres complètes de Marx et Engels".

Le texte de l'Institut de Moscou offre incontestablement une présentation plus systématique et par conséquent, plus accessible. Il n'en reste pas moins que la présentation de Landshut et Mayer constitue le texte de Marx tel qu'ils l'ont déchiffré et dans l'ordre où ils ont trouvé les pages du manuscrit.

En rangeant les feuilles du document qui était en fort mauvais état, Riazanov - à moins que ce ne soit Adoratski - les classa d'après la date à laquelle il présumait que chaque partie avait été conçue. Henri de Man et Victor Leemans ne semblent pas avoir trouvé de différences entre les versions de l'Institut de Moscou et celle de Landshut et Mayer. On peut cependant se demander s'ils ont pris le temps de se livrer à une étude comparée approfondie.

(5). V. Adoratski, "Einleitung", in Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe*, erste Abteilung, Band 3, p. XIII.

(6). Le moment de cette disparition correspond à celui signalé par Victor Serge dans *Mémoires d'un révolutionnaire*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1951, pp. 272, 3. Victor Serge situe l'arrestation de Riazanov aux environs de 1930 et sa mort en 1940.

(7). Victor Leemans *De jonge Marx en de Marxisten*, N.V. Standaard, Anvers-Amsterdam, 1962. L'auteur attribue la primeur non pas à l'édition de Riazanov, mais bien à celle de Landshut et Mayer dont la version, d'après lui, "parut quelques mois avant la publication de celle de Riazanov".

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'article d'Henri de Man n'en est pas moins révélateur d'une étape cardinale dans la pensée de Karl Marx. Lénine avait déjà constaté dans ses réflexions sur *La Sainte Famille* (1845), que cette étude marqua la transition de la philosophie hégélienne au socialisme. Henri de Man, manifestement surpris par la lecture d'une œuvre du jeune Marx inconnue jusqu'alors et représentant vraisemblablement une sorte d'introduction à *La Sainte Famille* et à *L'Idéologie allemande*, en déduit que les convictions socialistes auxquelles Marx venait d'adhérer au début des années 1840 étaient bel et bien motivées par des considérations humanistes et éthiques. Son article en fournit une analyse aussi fouillée que clarifiante. Il considère avec raison la troisième partie, qui traite de la philosophie et de la pratique, comme la plus importante.

Le socialisme du jeune Marx, tel qu'il ressort de ses manuscrits, est la manifestation agissante de forces vitales, inhérentes à la nature humaine. Etant par essence un être sensible, qui a des impulsions et des besoins, l'homme souffre et étant homme, il est seul capable parmi les êtres vivants de prendre conscience de sa nature souffrante, de la ressentir et, mû par la passion qui fait partie de la nature humaine, de transformer l'objet souffrant inconscient en sujet conscient.

L'homme cherche avec la passion (8) inhérente à sa nature à agir sur son milieu, sur la nature, sur sa propre nature, pour leur donner une perfection qui n'est autre que l'autoréalisation de l'homme. Cette autoréalisation, cette appropriation par l'homme de la nature s'opère par le travail. Du travail, Marx a une conception complexe car de l'instrument d'aliénation qu'il est dans les organisations sociales établies sur la propriété privée il se muera en instrument de libération dans le communisme. Au concept d'aliénation, que l'on trouve déjà chez Hegel et Feuerbach, le jeune Marx donne un contenu économique en se fondant sur l'observation de la société industrielle naissante dans laquelle il vivait et qui a amené la séparation des classes par la propriété privée, ainsi que l'asservissement du travail des hommes par la domination d'autres hommes.

(8). Marx emploie bien les termes "Leidenschaft" et "Passion" dans le même sens. cf. *Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), erste Abteilung, Band 3, p. 161.

Ainsi comprise, l'aliénation a vivement impressionné Henri de Man, car elle était proche de sa propre conception du travail déshumanisant dans l'industrie moderne. Aussi est-ce avec un vif intérêt qu'on lit les pages dans lesquelles il suit pas à pas la pensée du jeune Marx qui, tout en attribuant l'aliénation à l'opposition d'intérêts entre propriétaires et non-propriétaires des moyens de production, tout en regardant l'abolition de la propriété privée comme indispensable pour l'abolition de l'aliénation, considère cependant que l'exploitation capitaliste ne relève pas que de la propriété, mais qu'elle procède aussi d'un rapport de force. A la source de l'aliénation se trouve non seulement la répartition inégale de la fortune, mais surtout la répartition inégale du pouvoir. J'imagine la joie que dut éprouver de Man en prenant connaissance de ce point de vue du jeune Marx, si proche de celui qu'il a défendu avec ténacité et force d'arguments en lançant, quatre-vingt dix ans après la rédaction des manuscrits, la campagne pour son Plan du Travail, par lequel il voulut enlever les leviers de commande de notre vie économique, donc "le pouvoir" aux capitalistes, pour le confier aux représentants de la société, nommés par le gouvernement, lui-même issu démocratiquement de la volonté des citoyens.

Je voudrais me permettre de faire ici deux réflexions inspirées par l'actualité. S'il est vrai que dans beaucoup d'emplois de notre société moderne, le travail aliène ceux qui l'accomplissent, n'y a-t-il pas une plus grande aliénation encore du fait du chômage que connaissent beaucoup d'hommes surtout pendant les crises que traverse périodiquement la société moderne ?

Par ailleurs, l'abolition de la propriété privée des moyens de production et leur socialisation ou nationalisation ne garantit pas la fin de l'aliénation. Dans les Etats qui ont procédé à une socialisation globale des moyens de production, nous assistons à la formation d'une nouvelle classe qui, selon l'observateur pénétrant qu'est Milovan Djilas, "administre et distribue la propriété nationale. La nouvelle classe, ou son organe exécutif - l'oligarchie du parti - agit comme le propriétaire et est le propriétaire". (9). Aussi

(9). *The new Class - An analysis of the communist system by Milovan Djilas.*
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New-York 1957, p. 207.

quand de Man, interprétant la pensée du jeune Marx, écrit que "réhumanisation ne signifie cependant concrètement rien d'autre que socialisation, établissement de la véritable propriété humaine et sociale, comme devant entraîner nécessairement l'autoréalisation de l'homme", nous savons maintenant par les expériences pratiques qui se déroulent dans des pays de l'Est qu'il n'en est rien. Dans ces pays aussi le pouvoir de certains hommes, groupés dans un parti, agissant à l'aide d'une vaste et nombreuse bureaucratie et s'assurant l'appui d'une armée puissante, s'exerce de façon aussi absolue sur la majorité des hommes, y compris les travailleurs. Or, le pouvoir de "la nouvelle classe" dirigeante sur l'ensemble des citoyens est d'autant plus arbitraire et dur que la socialisation des moyens de production a été réalisée.

Le jeune Marx avait raison de dénoncer dans les structures mêmes de la société capitaliste (non seulement dans la concentration du capital, mais aussi dans celle du pouvoir) qui caractérisent cette forme de l'économie, les causes de l'aliénation et de la déshumanisation de l'homme. Selon lui, l'aliénation frappe aussi bien le capitaliste que le travailleur, parce que celui qui exploite est aussi éloigné de la nature humaine que l'est sa victime. Avec plus d'un siècle de recul, il nous apparaît cependant que l'abolition de la propriété privée et la socialisation que Marx a proposées comme devant mettre fin à l'aliénation et à la déshumanisation se sont avérées dans la pratique, à elles seules, non seulement inopérantes, mais même de nature à aggraver l'aliénation au lieu de l'abolir.

Henri de Man n'a pas manqué de souligner - et pour cause - la distinction que le jeune Marx fait dans ses manuscrits entre socialisme et communisme. A l'inverse des dirigeants du Kremlin qui présentent le socialisme comme une étape intermédiaire entre le capitalisme et le communisme, le jeune Marx considère ce dernier comme un moyen terme entre un état actuel et un état futur, comme la négation de la négation. Le socialisme, par contre, est d'après lui, la réalité positive (10).

(10). Karl Marx, *Oeuvres. Economie*. II. Edition établie par Maximilien Rubel, "Coll. La Pléiade", Gallimard, Paris, 1968, pp. 89 et 90.

Henri de Man attire notre attention sur le fait que Marx emploie à plusieurs reprises le terme "communisme grossier - rohen Kommunismus", basé sur "l'envie généralisée qui s'est érigée en pouvoir, n'étant rien d'autre que la forme déguisée de la cupidité restaurée". De Man a raison de déduire de son analyse que Marx "pour ses propres conceptions préfère les expressions socialisme et socialiste".

Pour preuve que de Man a jugé correctement la pensée du jeune Marx, citons les lignes par lesquelles celui-ci conclut ses considérations sur la propriété privée et le communisme : "Le communisme est le positif en tant que négation de la négation, donc le moment réel, nécessaire à la suite de l'évolution historique, de l'émancipation humaine et du recouvrement de l'homme par lui-même. Le communisme est la forme nécessaire et le principe énergétique du proche avenir, mais il n'est pas en soi le but du développement humain - la forme de la société humaine". (11).

Et ailleurs, Marx écrit que "pour l'homme socialiste, l'histoire dite universelle n'est rien d'autre que la génération de l'homme par le travail humain, rien d'autre que le devenir de la nature pour l'homme, c'est pour lui la preuve évidente et irréfutable de sa génération par lui-même, du processus de sa genèse". (12).

Je pense avoir suffisamment montré l'exceptionnelle importance que cet écrit représente dans la démarche intellectuelle de Marx, ainsi que l'extraordinaire intérêt qu'Henri de Man portait à ce document, qui lui permettait de découvrir un nouveau Marx si proche de lui-même qu'il pouvait se demander si les marxistes hérétiques, au nombre desquels il se comptait, n'avaient pas désormais le droit de se réclamer de Marx lui-même pour critiquer ce qui est issu de son œuvre sous la forme du "marxisme".

(11). Marx/Engels, MEGA, erste Abteilung, Band 3, p. 126. Marx, *Oeuvres. Economie. II*, "coll. la Pléiade", op. cit., p. 90.

(12). Marx/Engels, MEGA, erste Abteilung, Band 3, p. 126. Marx, *Oeuvres. Economie, II*, "coll. La Pléiade", op. cit., p. 89.

Comment se fait-il que cette conception de l'homme qui agit sur son milieu, sur la nature, sur sa destinée, en vertu de dispositions inhérentes à sa nature, n'ait pas été reprise et développée dans l'oeuvre ultérieure de Marx ? Il vaut la peine de lire la réponse très fine que de Man donne à cette question. Quoi qu'il en soit, de Man refuse de considérer cette conception comme étant dépassée par les écrits ultérieurs de Marx. Il en veut pour preuve une lettre que Marx écrivit le 24 avril 1867 - il avait alors 50 ans - à Engels, dans laquelle il estimait que "nous n'avons pas à rougir du travail fait par nous un quart de siècle plus tôt", c'est-à-dire au moment où le manuscrit fut rédigé.

Henri de Man a évidemment raison quand il dit "qu'il n'est en aucun cas permis de s'en défaire en disant que cet écrit de Marx n'est qu'une oeuvre de jeunesse, non parvenue à sa maturité". Bien au contraire, Henri de Man définit les écrits de Marx autour de l'année 1844, dont les manuscrits font partie, comme une "combinaison brillante de l'analyse des idées et de la synthèse stylistique, aussi géniale l'une que l'autre" et il n'hésite pas à affirmer que "compte tenu de ses qualités créatrices, le sommet de la production de Marx se situe entre 1843 et 1848".

Il est fort regrettable que ce point de départ éthique et humaniste du jeune Marx n'ait pas été constamment retenu par lui dans son oeuvre ultérieure et qu'il ait été complètement ignoré par ses épigones, dont l'interprétation forcément incomplète a servi et continue à servir pour juger, approuver ou condamner ce que l'on croit être le marxisme.

Si Marx dans ses travaux ultérieurs s'est surtout attaché à rationaliser ses intuitions de jeunesse et à leur donner une présentation scientifique, il n'empêche qu'il résulte clairement des manuscrits de 1844 et de l'analyse qu'en a faite Henri de Man, que la réalisation des objectifs socialistes suppose des hommes, dotés d'une énergie pratique (13) qui les pousse irrésistiblement à se libérer de toute contrainte, de toute exploitation, de toute servitude, de toute domination, pour réaliser pleinement ce qui est inscrit dans leur nature, c'est-à-dire en eux-mêmes.

(13). MEGA, erste Abteilung, Band 3, p. 121.

De tous les penseurs socialistes, celui dont la pensée me paraît la plus proche de celle du jeune Marx, ce n'est pas un de ses soi-disant épigones, mais bien Jean Jaurès, à moins que ce ne soit Henri de Man lui-même. Tous deux ont en commun avec Marx de vouloir une révolution en profondeur de la société et non pas une révolution comme celle de 1789, qui, d'après Marx, n'a servi que les intérêts de la bourgeoisie : "La Révolution n'est 'ratée' que pour cette masse qui, dans l' 'idée' politique, ne possédait pas l'idée de son 'intérêt' réel, pour cette masse dont le véritable principe vital ne coïncidait donc pas avec le principe vital de la Révolution et dont les conditions effectives d'émancipation diffèrent essentiellement des conditions dans lesquelles la bourgeoisie pouvait s'émanciper elle-même en émancipant la société." (14) On croirait lire le premier tome de la remarquable *Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française* de Jaurès.

Ce que le jeune Marx voulait, comme Jaurès, comme Henri de Man, c'était un changement fondamental de la société, une révolution authentique. Pour eux, les travailleurs en s'émancipant, émancipent toute la société; en se libérant de l'aliénation du travail, ils bannissent toute aliénation de la société; en se réalisant en tant qu'hommes, ils créent une société essentiellement humaine pour tous les hommes.

Il s'agit d'une conception de la révolution qui ne se réalise pas sur les barricades, qui n'aboutit pas en fin de compte à la guillotine, ni au goulag, qui ne brise pas l'élan printanier d'un peuple, joyeusement à la recherche de sa propre identité socialiste et humaine. La véritable révolution est un processus, jamais terminé, par lequel les masses laborieuses devenues conscientes de leurs aspirations, droits et besoins, ainsi que de la possibilité qu'offre la société industrielle de les réaliser, oeuvrent patiemment, énergiquement, inlassablement et avec ténacité pour créer une société dont l'essence s'identifie à la leur, c'est-à-dire une société qui, dans toute sa structure et dans toute sa vie, est essentiellement humaine et véritablement socialiste.

(14) Marx/Engels, *La Sainte Famille*, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1972, p. 103-4.

Tout cela, Henri de Man le dit lui-même, avec peut-être plus de force encore que dans son article du "Kampf", au cours d'une conférence faite sur le même sujet à l'*Institut für Sozialforschung* de Francfort, le 27 mai 1932. Le bâtiment qui servait de siège à l'Institut fut bombardé pendant la guerre et démoli par la suite. Il y avait un hall assez vaste qui occupait le centre du bâtiment et sur lequel donnaient, au rez-de-chaussée et sur la galerie du premier étage, un ensemble de classes et de cellules destinées aux chercheurs. C'est à l'Institut für Sozialforschung que de Man donnait son cours et tenait son séminaire.

Cette soirée de mai 1932 est restée gravée dans ma mémoire comme si c'était hier. Le hall était bondé à crequer. Tout ce que les facultés comptaient d'éléments de gauche, professeurs comme étudiants, était présent. Il faisait chaud. Les esprits étaient surexcités. La République de Weimar, ou ce qui en subsistait, était sur le point de basculer dans l'horreur du nazisme. Les plus clairvoyants voyaient venir la catastrophe, d'autres s'accrochaient désespérément à de vagues espoirs ; toute la gauche se rendait compte qu'il lui fallait une nouvelle orientation politique. La voix d'Henri de Man, encore que très controversée par la gauche, n'en fit pas moins entendre une note nouvelle, indiquant une solution possible à la crise et au chômage. De Man parla sans notes. En pleine communion avec son auditoire, dont il partageait les craintes et les espérances, il se montra brillant, brillant comme je ne l'avais jamais vu auparavant, ni ne le vis jamais plus depuis lors. C'était comme si la confirmation de ses idées par les manuscrits du jeune Marx le galvanisait dans son effort de convaincre ses auditeurs qui pour la plupart avaient subi l'influence de Marx ou étaient encore entièrement sous l'empire de l'auteur du *Manifeste communiste*.

Après son exposé, de Man fut ovationné par toute l'assistance debout. Un débat animé suivit. Y participèrent de nombreux professeurs et étudiants. L'intervention la plus frappante, s'élevant au niveau de l'exposé du conférencier, fut celle d'une jeune étudiante en philosophie, nommée pour autant que je me souviens, Lise Pachman, qui appuyait les vues de de Man en citant Kierkegaard. Elle pays plus tard sa croyance à un socialisme éthique, auquel elle resta fidèle jusqu'au bout, d'une exécution à la hache.

J'ai souvent eu l'impression que si cette conférence d'Henri de Man avait pu avoir lieu quelques mois plus tôt et s'accompagner d'une action politique comparable à celle qu'il déclencha un an plus tard en Belgique, le cours des événements politiques aurait pu prendre une tout autre orientation en Allemagne et la démocratie de la République de Weimar aurait pu être sauvée. Pour le malheur de l'Allemagne et du monde, l'exposé d'Henri de Man venait trop tard et il manquait à ce penseur brillant les qualités politiques suffisantes pour peser sur le cours des événements qui devaient aboutir au désastre.

En terminant la présentation de l'article d'Henri de Man sur les manuscrits du jeune Marx, je désire dire toute ma gratitude à l'égard de MM. Peter Dodge, Jan de Man et Michel Brélaz, qui en traduisant l'original allemand respectivement en français et en anglais, ont rendu ce texte, d'un intérêt passionnant, accessible à tous ceux qui, dans les pays de langue française et anglaise, sont concernés par les problèmes sociaux propres à notre époque. Je souhaite qu'ils soient nombreux à lire, soit la version française, soit la version anglaise, comme je souhaite qu'après avoir lu l'article d'Henri de Man, ils entreprennent l'étude des manuscrits de 1844, document indispensable pour comprendre Marx en profondeur. Ils découvriront alors une pensée d'une densité et d'une richesse sans pareille. Ils s'apercevront que, tout comme les manuscrits du jeune Marx, le remarquable article d'Henri de Man n'a rien perdu de son actualité ; il apporte au contraire des éléments indispensables pour apprécier le regain d'intérêt que connaît le marxisme depuis la guerre et qui continue à donner lieu à un large débat, lequel se poursuit activement et n'est pas près de s'éteindre.

HENDRIK DE MAN

THE NEWLY DISCOVERED MARX

(1932)

(traduction de Peter Dodge et Jan De Man)

Early this year a hitherto unknown work by Marx was published, one of decisive importance for the proper appreciation of the evolution and significance of Marxist theory. It will oblige many a follower and opponent of Marxism to reexamine their views, at least in regard to the philosophical and historical premises of Marxist thought. Indeed, this publication shows much more clearly than any other work by Marx the ethical and humanistic motives behind his socialist convictions and informing his entire life's output.

Admittedly we are faced, at first sight, with just one of the phases in the evolution of Marx's thought. This therefore leaves us with the question whether this "humanistic" phase is to be considered as an early evolutionary stage that was superseded later on, or whether it is to be considered a permanent component of Marx's teaching. At any rate, the question has now been asked and can no longer be circumvented. Orthodox Marxists who until now considered all of Marx's life-work (or at least that since 1843) as a systematic whole, and who supported their views of this whole with indiscriminate quotation from the *Civil War in France* (1870) or from the *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law* (1843) will now have to make up their minds : either this humanistic Marx belongs to Marxism, in which case both Kautsky's Marxism as well as Bukharin's will have to be thoroughly revised; or he does not belong to it, which would mean that there is a humanistic Marxism that can be called up against materialistic Marxism; while the heretics of Marxist orthodoxy (among whom I count myself) are faced with the question of to what point they are justified in resorting to Marx himself in criticizing what, stemming from Marx's work, has taken on the form of "Marxism".

Before asking this question, however, it will be well to take a look at the work itself, to see what it says, and to find out what significance it may have for the genesis of Marxist theory in general. It is a manuscript that has been kept in the archives of the Social Democratic Party of Germany. One of the reasons why it was left undisturbed for such a long time is obviously

that it is so illegible and in such a bad state of conservation that it took several months of deciphering before its contents were readable. As far as I know, D. Rjazanov was the first to persevere in this trial of patience. He had a Russian translation published in 1927, in the *Marx-Engels Archives*. The German original was published by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow only a few weeks ago, in the third volume of the first part of the complete German edition of the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

On nearly the same day another German edition was published by two Social Democratic writers in their collection of Marxist texts, of which the second volume contains, incidentally, the first complete reproduction of the *German Ideology* : Karl Marx, *Der historische Materialismus*, edited by S. Landshut and J.P. Mayer, with the publishers Alfred Körner, Leipzig 1932 (Vol. I, p. 295 ff.).

These two editions differ in many respects - which can be explained by the sorry state the manuscript is in. As far as I have been able to make out, however, these differences are of no significance for meaning. The edition by the Marx-Engels Institute bears the title : *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 : A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, whereas the German editors chose the title : *Political Economy and Philosophy*. The two editions vary greatly as to the arrangements of texts, presenting the several sections in a different order. In the present paper, I shall refer to the edition by the Marx-Engels Institute, as this seems to be better organized, and also because, being part of the only complete edition, it may be considered the standard edition - or will be in the future when, if ever, it will be completed.

Citations in the present translation are to the text as found in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, v. 3 (New York : International Publishers, 1975). A few passages, marked by an asterisk, have been retranslated. In order to facilitate readability in English, Marx's typographical emphases have been omitted, and the spelling has been Americanized for the sake of consistency. (Note of the translators).

The text has a length of about 140 printed pages. It consists of a number of fragments, not always in obvious connection with one another, especially since several sections have been lost or have become totally illegible; in between we find a few unfinished notes and excerpts. There is a prologue, which goes to prove that Marx intended to publish the manuscripts. He obviously still had this intention when, on 1 February 1845, he entered into a contract with the editor Leske, in Darmstadt, regarding publication of a work called "A Critique of Politics and Political Economy". If publication did not take place, this may be a consequence of extraneous circumstances (the banishment from France in 1845), but is probably due more to inner motives. The "Critique of Political Economy" which Marx presents in his foreword as the next main task was then still embryonic, and was postponed until he had dealt with the Young Hegelians (*The Holy Family*), Stirner (*Saint Max*), and Proudhon (*The Poverty of Philosophy*); and then he lost time with the Revolution of 1848. It did not mature until, much later, it could be transcribed as *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* and as, finally, *Capital*.

We may tentatively subdivide the *Manuscripts* into three parts : one on economics, one on theoretical philosophy, and one on positive philosophy, which might also be called social anthropology.

The section on economics contains discussions of capital, labor, private property, profits, rent, etc. - and may be considered to be a preliminary version of *Capital*. The section on philosophical theory culminates in a critique of Hegelianism and Young Hegelianism and in practice amounts to a preliminary study for the *Holy Family*, published in 1845. Lastly, under the heading of "positive philosophy", we may classify his discussion of the connection between man and nature, the division of labor and the alienation of labor, work and culture, consumption and production, private property and communism, and the like. I believe this latter part deserves the most attention, since it deals, unlike the other two sections, with subjects which are not dealt with in a more complete, mature, and precise way in his later works. Rather, we here find trains of thought which indeed appear as germs in earlier works but which later

on are never dealt with so explicitly, although they are obviously of essential importance for proper comprehension of these works, being, in a way, their tacitly assumed premises.

This shows up especially in the connection appearing in the *Manuscripts* between philosophical assumptions and their economic and sociological implications. However, the full importance of this link cannot be appreciated until one has become acquainted with the positive contents of Marx's social and philosophical creed as laid down here. I shall therefore try, first of all, to make a complete picture out of the chaos of fragments, sticking as closely as possible to the author's words.

* * *

The year 1844, which Marx spent in Paris, confirmed the decisive turning in the phase of development that led him from abstract philosophical questioning to concrete socialistic answering. As is well known, Marx developed from a liberal democrat to a socialist parallel with a change in concern from Hegelian philosophy to capitalistic economics and to the history of class struggle. His point of departure was insight into the inadequacy of Hegelian historical philosophy, which became visible to Marx in a concrete way in the vain attempts of the Young Hegelians to reduce historical tasks simply to the formation of another "consciousness".

For Hegel the meaning of history was the realization of a moral idea. This moral idea attains realization by the process through which reality becomes conscious of itself. The contrast between reality and idea in thus transcended in the very process of attaining consciousness. In this process the object turns into the subject.

Though Marx was also oriented to the goal of this transformation of object into subject, by 1843 he had already arrived at the view that this cannot be only a matter of consciousness. To him this transformation is a task yet to be accomplished. However, this task could be accomplished not in the abstract field of consciousness but only under condition of the transcendence of the subject-object contradiction in social reality.

Whereas Hegel, as Marx wrote in 1843 in his *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*, "everywhere treats the idea as subject", Marx wanted the concrete human being to be the subject.

Criticism of Hegelianism, in those years, still moved entirely in a field where consciousness and existence, idea and reality, thought and life, abstraction and object, intellect and the senses, were antitheses. In Marx's writings of 1843 and 1844 countless synonyms of this type of antithesis crop up again and again. Only very occasionally does the expression "matter" or "material" appear. Whenever it does, it is always in contexts in which he aims to show a contrast between the abstract and ideal on the one hand, and, on the other, the "real", "concrete", or, according to a phrase he particularly liked to use, the "sensuous". And these expressions were used only when it was a question of the natural or objective surroundings of man, not for reality as a whole. Here "material" means (as is explicitly said on p. 335) "pertaining to objects", not "real" in general ; and the "objectification" of reality is one of those characteristics of consciousness "dehumanized" by capitalism, which socialism is destined to transcend, together with the antithesis of "spirituality and materialism" (p. 302).

In the *Manuscripts* these distinctions are elaborated much more clearly, Marx not only opposing concrete existence to abstract consciousness but also analyzing concrete existence in terms of its essential components. He does this first of all by discussing the relationship of man and nature.

Since man himself is an objective being, "man is part of nature" (p. 276). "Man is the human part of nature" (p. 335)*. The aim of evolution is the unity of the two, "the complete unity of man with nature -- the true resurrection of nature -- the accomplished naturalism of man and the accomplished humanism of nature" (p. 298). With respect to the relationship between man and nature, this means abolition of the contradiction of object and subject by the self-realization of man, i.e., by the full development of his natural life-forces.

Until that point, however, man's relation to nature is as to an object, or as a natural entity alienated from nature. As a natural being, man is in part endowed with natural forces, with life-forces ; he is an active natural being ; these forces exist within him as capacities and as drives. In part he must be considered as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, and objective being that is passive, conditional, and limited, just like animals and plants - which means that the objects of his drives exist outside of him, as objects independent of him ; but these objects are objects of his needs, indispensable for the fulfillment and assertion of his inner forces ; they are indispensable objects. Man being a corporeal, naturally activated, vital, real, sensuous, and objective being means that real, sensuous objects are the matter of his existence, of his life-expression, that he can express his life only in real, sensuous objects.

The relationship between man and nature, however, is not like that of one object to another, but is a dynamic, "activated" relationship (p. 336). Since man is "sensuous", i.e., has drives and needs he "suffers" (p. 337), and since he "feels his sufferings", he is "a passionate being" (p. 337). Feeling of "passion" (p. 337) is also the driving force behind all human activity - a conviction by which Marx comes closer to Thomas Aquinas's psychology as well as to that of modern depth psychology than to the Hegelian philosophy of consciousness. The only point in which man differs from animal is in his capacity to become conscious of his suffering, that is to say, of his objective and subjective nature, thereby transforming himself from an unwittingly suffering object into a consciously feeling subject who wishes to fashion his surroundings - including nature - in accordance with his own image. "Man appropriates his comprehensive essence in a comprehensive manner, that is to say, as a whole man", not only by "having" but by "seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving..." (pp. 299-300).

The objectivity of man's existence manifests itself in the fact that he is a "sensuous being", i.e., that he is equipped with senses. These senses however are not only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the active senses (will, love, etc.)*. These spiritual and active senses are

the true and proper "human sense", since their very object is human. The self-realization of man therefore assumes that these vital drives inherent in this sensuous constitution can be realized with respect to a human object, i.e., upon humanized mankind as well as upon "humanized nature" (p. 302).

The formation of the human senses is the work of the entire history of the world. In this process the refinement and the gratification of the five senses are only a preliminary stage. "The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense" (p. 302). "Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are ... genuinely human functions ;" only "taken abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal functions" (p. 275). But only when these needs are satisfied is there a possibility "to make man's sense human ... to create a human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural existence" (p. 302).

In this process of development work plays the decisive role. If man is to appropriate nature and thereby realize himself, he must first of all consider it as "his own body" (p. 87), as his own substance. The destiny of man as a conscious being implies he must validate himself by "creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his work upon inorganic nature" (p. 276). In this he differs from animals by producing not simply under the pressure of specific and immediate needs but also "freely", i.e., with a view to general and future needs, and even quite independently from need and only according to "measure inherent in the object" (p. 277)* ; for "man forms objects in accordance with the laws of beauty" (p. 277).

History is therefore "the true natural history of man", a goal-oriented process, the "act of the creation of man"*, but it is distinct from natural history proper in being "a conscious act of creation"* (p. 337) that "transcends itself" through consciousness, i.e., translated from Hegelian terminology into everyday language, by carrying its meaning into execution.

Work is therefore not only, as economics supposes, a "source of livelihood" (p. 241) of a "beast reduced to the strictest bodily needs" (p. 242), but is a means whereby man transcends his suffering, and changes from an object into a subject of history. "Man's own labor produces" real man ; it transcends the contradiction of man and nature : "true, because real man" is the "outcome of man's own labor" (p. 333).

Hence the "human status and dignity of labor" (p. 92), hence also its social and society-creating character : "just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him" (p. 298).

"Freely chosen, conscious activity is man's characteristic as a species"*, for "the whole character of a species ... is contained in the character of its life activity", and the "productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life" (p. 276).

Therefore, for "socialist man" (and here Marx anticipates the postwar slogan of the Young Socialists) "the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation of man through human labor, nothing but the emergence of nature for man..." (p. 305).

* * * * *

In the stage of this evolution up to the present, this result has indeed been purchased at the price of the alienation of man from his work and from its object.

To mold nature is a social activity, which is possible only through the social cooperation of men. This social characteristic of labor is, however, at the basis of the division of labor and therefore of private property. This circumstance and the alienation which is its consequence are a necessary step in evolution, since man must transform nature into an object before he can

realize unity with it in consciousness ; he must transcend it before he can bring it to his own level.

The idea of alienation has a central place in this work. It is the effective link between the purely philosophical parts that discuss Hegel and the economic parts that apparently deal with quite a different matter, discussing Smith and Ricardo.

The simplest philosophical formula for alienation is the "opposition of object and subject" (p. 331). This opposition is identical with that between objectification and self-determination, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species" (p. 296). All alienation, in the last resort, is alienation of something human from something human. "The estrangement of man ... is expressed only in the relationship in which a man stands to other men" (p. 277). When man approaches the things he needs for life and the products of his work as "an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of himself", he enters into conflict with his "objectified labor" itself, and with "the master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, independent of him" (p. 278). The concrete expression of alienation in present society is thus the separation of classes by means of private property. This presupposes "unfree labor" as an "activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke of another man" (pp. 278-279).

Private property, as the necessary consequence of "estranged labor" (p. 279), therefore lies at the basis of alienation. Alienated work however means alienated life, alienated humanity, and this not only on the part of the worker but "on the part of the non-worker" (p. 279) ; the proprietor therefore is just as much dehumanised as the non-proprietor. "Estrangement is manifested not only in the fact that my means of life belong to someone else, that which I desire is the inaccessible possession of another, but also in the fact that everything is itself something different from itself - that my activity is something else

and that, finally (and this applies also to the capitalist), all is under (the sway) of inhuman power" (p. 314). The self-alienation of man by property is expressed in all men through the domination of possession, i.e., of the object over existence, and thus the subject. This is an impoverishment of "all physical and spiritual senses" - it is "absolute poverty" of "human nature" in all respects.

In thus reasoning, Marx attaches as much importance to alienation from work, that is, to the problem of work satisfaction, as to alienation from the product of work, that is, to the problem of exploitation. "What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor? First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it." (p. 274)

As a matter of fact, not all men suffer from this general dehumanization in the same way. "If the product of labor does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, then this can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker. If the worker's activity is a torment to him, to another it must give satisfaction and pleasure. Not the gods, not nature, but only man himself can be this alien power over man." (p. 278)

Therefore, the social expression of alienation is to be seen in the conflict of interests between owners and non-owners of the means of production. In the economic part of these manuscripts this conflict of interests is analyzed

and substantiated in sentences which already contain all the essential basic ideas of *Capital*, from labor considered as a commodity to the thesis of growing impoverishment and the conflict of interests. This part is just about as fully developed as his essay on "Salaried Labor and Capital" of 1847. It should be especially noted that here the capitalistic relation of exploitation is not described merely as a relationship among quantitative entities but everywhere as a relationship of power, being presented as the result of the unequal distribution of social power. It should further be noted that here Marx does not use the language of a purely scientific analysis of reality ostensibly void of value-judgments, but that the moral indignation which obviously lies at the basis of his analysis becomes quite openly manifest in the explicit connection he makes between the idea of expropriation and the belief in alienation and dehumanization. The following passage is typical in this respect : "According to the economic laws the estrangement of the worker in his object is expressed thus : the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume ; the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes ; the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker ; the more civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker ; the more powerful labor becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker ; the more ingenious labor becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature's servant" (p. 273).

The thesis Marx developed later on in his *Poverty of Philosophy* and in his *Communist Manifesto* that capitalistic evolution was necessary as a preliminary step toward socialism is here supported with the argument that it is precisely the alienation of labor that creates the conditions leading to the definitive transcendence of this alienation.

The transcendence of alienation as the self-realization of man can therefore consist only in rehumanizing the estranged object which lies at the basis of alienation. Humanization however here means concretely nothing other than socialization, nothing other than the introduction of "truly human and social property" in place of, and beyond, private property.

The alienated relationship between man and the estranged object of his activity can only cease by making this very object itself human. "...Man does not lose himself in his object (except)* when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is possible only when the object becomes for him a social object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object.

On the one hand, therefore, it is only when the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers - that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his objects : that is, man himself becomes the object" (p. 301).

Thus abolition of private property is more than the mere realization of one of the workers' interests. It is "the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities" (p. 300), the making of man in "the entire richness of his being, of the rich man profoundly endowed with all the senses" (p. 302). In order that "man" may become the object of "sensuous" consciousness and that the requirements of "man as man" may become his need - for this, the whole of history is preparatory (p. 303).

Riches here do not mean merely the satisfaction of needs, but also - and in this, alienation as means of creating needs is a necessary intermediate step - an increase in the number of needs. But Marx does not thereby mean "vulgar needs" (p. 303) for external objects, but man's need for human satisfactions. "It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life - the man in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity, as need. Not only wealth, but likewise the poverty of man - under the assumption of socialism - receives in equal measure a human and therefore social significance. Poverty is the passive bond which causes the human being to experience the need of the greatest wealth - the other human being" (p. 304).

The place taken by the need for money, the "only true need produced by the economic system" (p. 307), by the merely quantitative and therefore "intemperate and excessive" (p. 307) need which pushes man to be "the contriving and ever calculating slave to inhuman, blasé, unnatural, and imaginary appetites" (p. 307) - this place now taken by these "crude needs" (p. 307) will then be taken by "human needs".

This is first of all sheer natural need, such as the need for food, for "light, air, and cleanliness" (p. 308), "physical exercise" (p. 309), etc. ; but above and beyond this, the need of man for man. "But that which mediates my life for me, also mediates the existence of other people for me. For me it is the other person" (p. 323). "Assume man to be man and his relationship to the world to be a human one : then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc. If you want to enjoy art, you must be an artistically cultivated person ; if you want to exercise influence over other people, you must be a person with a stimulating and encouraging effect on other people. Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. If you love without evoking love in return - that is, if your loving as loving does not produce reciprocal love ; if through a living expression of yourself as a loving person you do not make yourself a beloved one, that your love is impotent - a misfortune" (p. 326).

The emancipation of human senses and qualities therefore means that "these senses and attributes have become, subjectively and objectively, human. The eye has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object - an object made by man for man. ...Need or enjoyment has consequently lost its egotistical nature, and nature has lost its mere utility by use becoming human use.

In the same way, the senses and enjoyment of other men have become my own appropriation. Besides these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop in the form of society ; thus, for instance, activity in direct association with others, etc., has become an organ for expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating human life" (pp. 300-301).

Man must therefore first alienate himself from nature as an object, by acting as a subject, in order to be able to realize the unity of subject and object upon a higher level. The means toward this process is "production" that transforms nature, "even though in an estranged form", into "true anthropological nature" (p. 303).

This totally humanistic view as to the goal of historical evolution is the basis of identity between the "interest of the worker" and the "interest of society" (p. 240). Liberation from capitalism is also the liberation of the capitalist ; for even if indeed "capital is the governing power over labor and its products" (p. 247), there is also "the governing power of capital over the capitalist himself" (p. 247).

The contradiction of interests resulting from the alienation of labor and the transformation of the worker into a commodity is therefore only the product of a state of affairs in which it is greed that leads to dehumanization, and not an external natural law of historical development. Here Marx quite clearly says why in setting out to prove how real this contradiction of interests is and how the conflicts arising therefrom "necessarily lead to revolution" (p. 270), he started from the utilitarian and hedonistic social-psychological assumptions of economics. He did not do this because of his own belief in egoism and greed as essential natural motives of human action ; to him, on the contrary, they are only a compulsion and necessity imposed on man by capitalism. It sounds like a passage that could fit into the Preface to *Capital* when Marx writes, on p. 270 : "We have proceeded from the premises of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws. We presupposed private property, the separation of labor, capital and land, and of wages, profit of capital and rent of land - likewise

division of labor, competition, the concept of exchange-value, etc. On the basis of political economy itself, in its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and becomes indeed the most wretched of commodities ; that the wretchedness of the worker is in inverse proportion to the power and magnitude of his production ; that the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands, and thus the restoration of monopoly in a more terrible form ; and that finally the distinction between capitalist and land rentier, like that between the tiller of the soil and the factory worker, disappears and that the whole of society must fall apart into the two classes - the property owners and the propertyless workers". But : "Political economy starts with the fact of private property ; it does not explain it to us. It expresses in general, abstract formulas the material process through which private property actually passes, and these formulas it then takes for laws. It does not comprehend these laws, i.e., it does not demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property". "As to how far these external and apparently accidental circumstances are but the expression of a necessary course of development, political economy teaches us nothing". "The only wheels which political economy sets in motion are greed and the war amongst the greedy - competition" (pp. 270-271).

However, Marx explicitly stresses that this limitation of economic knowledge to only a part of human activity in a quite well-defined phase of development is itself just another symptom of alienation and of the "devaluation of man" (p. 271) by the "money system" (p. 271). So-called economic law is only a presentation of one side of a temporary reality, and not even in this momentary phase does it account for the whole of human activity. Hence also the present contradiction of the "laws of economics" and the "laws of morality" (p. 310).

"The political economy of ethics is the opulence of a good conscience, of virtue, etc., ; but how can I live virtuously if I do not live ? And how can I have a good conscience if I do not know anything? It stems from the very

nature of estrangement that each sphere applies to me a different and opposite yardstick - ethics one and political economy another ; for each is a specific estrangement of man and focuses attention on a particular field of estranged essential activity, and each stands in an estranged relation to the other" (p. 310). And this is followed by a sentence which presents the whole of Marxist doctrine about the economic causes of social development from the outset as a theory of the conditions that must be fulfilled in order to achieve freedom from economic predetermination : "Moreover, the opposition between political economy and ethics is only an apparent opposition and just as much no opposition as it is an opposition. All that happens is that political economy expresses moral laws in its own way" (p. 311).

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In this work Marx writes of the relationship between private property and socialized property in terms that illustrate particularly clearly his idea of the stages of capitalism and industrialism.

The essential part of his statement is found in the pages in which he criticizes the communist movement of his time.

In this matter Marx generally sticks to the distinction between socialism and communism that was then customary in France : socialism was considered the more comprehensive term for all those movements aiming at the cooperative organization of society, while communism was a more restricted term preferred for proletarian movements calling for the radical abolition of private property. Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, Louis Blanc, and Proudhon, for instance, were generally called socialists, whereas Weitling and Cabet were called communists.

This should be kept in mind for proper comprehension of the way in which Marx approaches socialism and communism. For his own views he prefers the terms socialism and socialistic. He identifies himself with communism only up to a certain point. To him the essential difference seems to be that socialism

appears to him as the positive final goal, whereas communism rather appears as a present-day movement produced directly by capitalism. Using the means of expression he found in Hegel and Feuerbach, which he applies more than once to this matter, to him socialism is the position while communism is the negation of negation.

In the section that he devotes to criticism of Hegelian dialectics, Marx says that one of Feuerbach's greatest achievements was to have opposed "the negation of the negation, which claims to be the absolute positive, the self-supporting positive, positively based on itself" (p. 328). Marx himself applies this distinction to communism, calling it a "mediator" between a present and a future state of affairs. It is not yet the "positive humanism" in which alienation will be annulled; but it is the "advent of practical humanism", because "as the supersession of private property (it) is the vindication of real human life as man's possession". Communism is therefore "humanism mediated with itself through the supersession of private property. Only through the supersession of this mediation - which is itself, however, a necessary premise - does positively self-deriving humanism, positive humanism, come into being" (pp. 341-342).

Therefore communism, "because of its character as negation of the negation, as the appropriation of the human essence through the intermediary of the negation of private property" is "not yet the true, self-originating position but rather a position originating from private property" (p. 313). "...But socialism as socialism no longer stands in any need of such a mediation. It proceeds from the theoretically and practically sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as the essence. Socialism is man's positive self-consciousness ... just as real life is man's positive reality, no longer mediated through the abolition of private property, through communism. Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and the dynamic principle

of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development, the form of human society" (p. 306).

The "crudeness" of communism, of which Marx repeatedly speaks, essentially consists in its appropriation of capitalist ways of thought, according to which life is mere "having", mere "means of life" (p. 300). Communism must therefore become aware of itself as a "self-transcending movement" (p. 313). It will thus pass through "in actual fact a very rough and protracted process. But we must regard it as a real advance to have at the outset gained a consciousness of the limited character as well as of the goal of this historical movement - and a consciousness which reaches out beyond it" (p. 313).

It is therefore necessary in the first place to have "actual communist action" - "history will lead to it" (p. 313) ; however, this movement is primarily a necessary intermediate step and precondition, since it arises from still existing needs, needs arising from alienation itself. The abolition of alienation obviously "always proceeds from that form of the estrangement which is the dominant power : in Germany, self-consciousness ; in France, equality, because it is politics ; in England, real, material, practical need taking only itself as its standard" (p. 313). And to this Marx immediately adds : "It is from this standpoint that Proudhon is to be criticised and appreciated".

To criticise and appreciate is the term for the extensive critique that Marx applies to the communism of his time, on pages 294 to 297.

He does this by a distinction between "crude, still immature" and a "fully developed" communism (p. 297) - which in his image of socialism is identical to "fully developed humanism" (p. 296). In criticizing crude communism Marx names only Cabet and Villegardelle (p. 297), although the tenor of his

text shows that in so doing he also thought of Weitling and of the proletarian communistic opinions which were widespread in the workmen's clubs of his time. The reproaches he formulates against this crude communism are essentially as follows :

1. Its conceptualization of socialization does not go beyond a "community of labor, and equality of wages paid out by communal capital - by the community as the universal capitalist. Both sides of the relationship are raised to an imagined universality - labor as the category in which every person is placed, and capital as the acknowledged universality and power of the community" (p. 295). It is therefore still "infected by and steeped in" (p. 296) private property ; "the relationship of private property persists as the relationship of the community to the world of things" (p. 294), and private property is thereby generalized even more (p. 294) rather than positively abolished (p. 296).
2. This communism has not yet grasped "the human nature of need" (p. 296) ; it is still caught up in envy and avarice. "General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which greed re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in another way. The thought of every piece of private property as such is at least turned against wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level; so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism is only the culmination of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum" (p. 295).
3. This kind of communism being "only a generalization and consummation" of private property, "the dominion of material bulks so large that it wants to destroy everything which is not capable of being possessed by all as private property. It wants to disregard talent, etc., in an arbitrary manner. For it the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical possession. The category of the worker is not done away with, but

extended to all men" (p. 294). "How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization; the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it" (p. 295). In short, "this type of communism - since it negates the personality of man in every sphere - is but the logical expression of private property, which is this negation" (p. 295).

4. "Finally, this movement of opposing universal private property to private property finds expression in the brutish form of opposing to marriage (certainly a form of exclusive private property) the community of women, in which a woman becomes a piece of communal and common property. It may be said that this idea of the community of women gives away the secret of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism" (p. 294).

It corresponds to Marx's conception of communism as "an engaged movement" to see it as in the flux of constant development. To "perfect" itself, it will suffice for communism to free itself from its entanglement with the conditions and limitations which have their historical roots in capitalism, when "its thinking consciousness" will "comprehend and know" its "becoming" (p. 297), in order for it to transform itself from "one of the manifestations of the vileness of private property" (p. 296) into a "positive community system" (p. 296). Only then will it be able to realize itself "as real appropriation of the human essence by and for man", "as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being, a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth of previous development" (p. 296). Then also the earth will become "once more a true personal property of man, through free labor and free enjoyment" (p. 268) ; then, man will once more "believe in man" (p. 270).

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This summary gives only a very incomplete idea of the richness of thought in this writing of Marx's ; its purely economic parts are, in particular, dealt with most superficially. Nevertheless, it surely suffices to show in

which essential ways the picture of Marx's philosophy hereby revealed differs from the conception reigning in present-day Marxism - and even more in anti-Marxism.

This Marx is a realist, not a materialist. His refusal to accept philosophical idealism does not lead him to set it against the so-called higher reality of matter ; rather, he subordinates both realities to the more comprehensive reality of life in its active and passive, conscious and unconscious totality. Instead of substituting "material causes" for "spiritual causes", he sees both as the temporally conditioned realization and self-determination of partial phenomena within a single, total, vital process. And to him the end of this process is not just the consummation of material causes but the full development of life-forces leading, instead, to liberation from domination by matter (as in the form of economic needs).

As we would say today, he does not regard this process as causal but as teleological. Right from the beginning it is linked by the life-forces inherent in nature, especially in human nature, to a goal of perfection. This process thereby fulfills a "destiny" and embodies "meaning" - a point of view which is rightly viewed as Christian heritage by S. Landshut in the commentary in his edition. The same can be said with respect to the idea of a harmonious final state, in which man and nature, the individual and society, natural instinct and true morality are again reconciled ; just as capitalism, with its alienation that has to be passed through as an intermediary stage, and labor, which is first experienced as "torment" and "punishment" so that it can become a means toward liberation, really do not mean other than what is expressed in Christianity through its symbols of the fall of man, temptation, purgatory, etc.

Instead of the "progress" of bourgeois social philosophy ensured by mechanical-technical forces, we are here confronted with a process of generation, an act of creation with a meaning that is realized only in execution. In this

process the fundamental, abiding human motives are not economic interests - which dominate only under private property in the shape of dehumanization - but vital needs, which man can satisfy only by man, and whose most complete expression is the love of man for man.

This theory of motivation is a humanistic one, not an economic one. Marx bases it on anthropology and psychology, on the natural goal-directedness of the drives from which the emotions and wants arise. This corresponds to quite a different idea as to the psychological model of action than the materialistic-causal one that explains everything as arising from the knowledge of material circumstances, above all from the consciousness of interests : loving, hating, willful man stands in the forefront and is himself as the truly active and generative part of those "circumstances" reflected in consciousness.

Socialism is therefore more than only a negation of capitalism ; going further, it represents a new positive principle that owes its humanly universal validity to its correspondence with life-forces inciting man to struggle against dehumanization. Here not only socialism as a final goal but the labor movement as well appear in a humanistic way as the expression of plain human nature wrestling for self-expression.

This Marxism is in no way amoral. It explicitly accepts the existence of moral goals, as in the Hegelian idea of history as the realization of absolute morality ; his criticism of Hegelianism bears only on the idea that this realization need appear only in consciousness and not in social reality. That is why Marx calls his conception of society (as expressed in the opening sentence to the Preface to the *Holy Family*) "real humanism" in contrast to "speculative idealism". Thereby the locus of moral realization simply passes from consciousness to existence. Not until later, and especially in his *Poverty of Philosophy*, does he explicitly justify his rejection of the idea of "eternal" ideas and ethical "principles" ; and this does not mean he denies these ideas and values, but that he finds they change with time, as history shows. To him this proves only that in the relation between man and his

surroundings each new situation comes to human consciousness in a different way.

All the rest is nothing but polemical elaboration in the strife against speculative idealism. Yet there always remains the clash between idea and reality as the expression of the clash between man as a suffering and therefore as a desiring and valuing being and his surroundings alienated from him by private property. The doctrine about the "senses" from which needs and interests arise simply means that moral (and, by the way, aesthetic) valuation is built into human needs. Man bears in himself his scale of values and his goals ; ethics and aesthetics are immanent in the basis of life. He explicitly recognizes the determination of consciousness by ethical valuation, but these valuations transcend each reality only inasmuch as human nature transcends this reality. This transcendence is therefore human and natural, not superhuman and supernatural. Man judges each set of "circumstances" on the basis of inclinations which are not determined by these circumstances but which are part of human nature and lead man toward his destiny.

Therefore the later restriction of this vital immanence of ethics to a mere immanence of the spirit is not true for human history as a whole, but only for the era of private property, especially of capitalism. The great difference between the "humanistic" and "materialistic" phases of Marxist development thus lies only in the fact that, later on, Marx ceased to expound his moral beliefs - partly because in so doing, he hoped not to jeopardize his claim that this analysis of society was based on purely scientific, value-free deduction ; probably partly also from the ostensibly arrogant but really humble attitude of the man, whose faith was in deeds and as such too holy to him to admit of much open discussion ; and in last part also because he reacted bitterly to his own disappointments and to the moral cant of his idealistic and utopian opponents. However that may be, the *Manuscripts* mark the spot where his originally bourgeois-liberal humanism turns into proletarian-socialistic humanism - which in fact is the consistent application of humanistic thinking to capitalistic society.

Now what does this humanistic Marx mean for Marxism? Is the perspective here presented something that was later on superseded, or is it a conceptualization that must be considered to be a meaningful premise for the whole of Marx's life-work?

To answer this question would require more and deeper consideration about the development of Marxist throughout the years than can be expounded here. We shall have to rest satisfied with the indication that the answer can by no means be put off with the contention that these *Manuscripts* are just an "immature" product of youth.

It is true that Marx was only 26 years old at this time; but the *Communist Manifesto*, which showed him to be at a height he never surpassed as a creator of thought and as a writer is only about three years later. The period of youthful work, which now is of biographical interest only, closes in 1843 at the latest. He had taken the step to socialism at least one year before he wrote the *Manuscripts*. He had already laid down his most important ideas by 1843 in his criticism of the Hegelian philosophy of law, in his letters to Ruge, in the *Jewish Question*, etc. The whole of his later work was devoted to their elaboration and scientific confirmation: the proletariat as the object of history, becoming its real subject; proletarian suffering as a modern expression of historical necessity; the emancipation of the proletariat viewed as the emancipation of mankind; the real dialectic of history as the history of class struggle; the dependence of ideologies on existing social circumstances; etc. The hectic studying he indulged in in Paris in 1844 served only to spell out and confirm in detail these ideas. His contemporary short writings and the fragments of which some have lost their way to land in the *Manuscripts* go to prove how far he had already succeeded with the three great tasks which then absorbed him: the final settlement with Hegelianism, the criticism of classical political economy, and the study of French revolutionary history.

In this context it should be kept in mind that Marx's economic theory was then only in its beginnings, whereas the philosophical premises of Marxist thought found their most mature and most comprehensive formulation in the "final settlement" with Hegelianism. The reason Marx himself had for

this final settlement, incidentally, shows one of the reasons why he did not strive to have the *Manuscripts* published. As he expressed it, the philosophical labors of that period served him in the first place as a means to "self-understanding". He already says this quite clearly in his letter to Ruge of September 1843 (published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*): this "self-understanding" is a "mere confession, and nothing more". To go to the confessional publicly would make sense only so long as the struggle was confined to the field of purely philosophical discussion. The same letter to Ruge however already announces that this field has to be abandoned: "The reformation of consciousness consists only in letting the world become aware of its consciousness, in awakening the world out of its dreams about itself, in explaining to it what its own actions are."

In his Parisian year of 1844 Marx had already set to work upon this program: as he says in the same letter, "identification" with "real" struggles (i.e., social and political, not philosophically abstract ones), the "analysis" of existent types of consciousness in their real, historical, social-economic context--in short, as explained in the Preface to the *Manuscripts* themselves, the transformation of philosophical into economic and political criticism. Philosophical self-understanding, which until September 1843 appeared to Marx as a collective matter, turned into a private affair, for, henceforth, the work on hand is no more "preaching of morals" (*Deutsche Ideologie*, v. 2, p. 238 of the Landshut-Mayer edition), but rather realizing socialism; it is not to interpret the world, but to change it (*Thesen zu Feuerbach*); it is not to throw into philosophical discussion his ethico-humanistic confession of faith but rather to realize it through direct political action.

With regard to the objective contents of this confession of faith, even as an old man Marx has himself told us that he in no way considered it as a superseded viewpoint. There is evidence of this in his letter of 24 April 1867 to Friedrich Engels in which he tells of his stay with Dr. Kugelmann in Hanover: "Here I have come across the *Holy Family* again. (...) I was agreeably surprised to find that we need not be ashamed of our work, though the cult of Feuerbach now has a rather comic effect."

This appreciation of the *Holy Family* may safely be extended to the *Manuscripts*; for the latter writings, which apparently had been already more or less finished shortly before Engels's visit to Paris at the end of August 1844, contain the real core of the *Holy Family*, which, planned on the visit, was to be of a rather restricted and mainly polemical thrust. In some respects the *Holy Family* belongs to an even less mature period of development than the *Manuscripts*, for it is much more retrospectively oriented toward polemics with Young and Post-Hegelian philosophy and contains many more passages in which even the language shows the author to be imprisoned in the kind of problems and thought of this philosophy. When one considers how many sections of the *Holy Family* are made unpalatable by the Hegel-F Feuerbach type of jargon, and by what Mehring calls "rancorous, too quarrelsome and too long-winded polemics", then the *Manuscripts* deserve this criticism less than does the *Holy Family* itself. Those sections in which the Marx of the *Communist Manifesto* already appears are present in a much higher percentage than those (not always very entertaining) sections of the *Holy Family* where the former friend of Bruno Bauer builds puzzles out of fragments of his Hegelian egg-shells.

Admittedly, in the *Manuscripts* the influence of Hegelian categories as well as the "cult of Feuerbach" are also very noticeable in the conceptual organization. But that is not a sufficient reason to exclude them from Marxism as an alien body; for the same might be said, with more or less justification, of all of Marx's works. If his historical philosophy is "Hegel put on his feet instead of his head", it is nonetheless a child of the Hegelian mind. We may safely admit also that in regard to the shape and order of these thoughts even the positive philosophical confession of faith Marx presents is not only sketchy throughout but is also deficient in many places. Especially where he attempts social-psychological and social-anthropological systematization, he shows a weakness in sticking too closely in his formulation to Hegelian terminology. But these weaknesses are formal rather than essential. In view of the maturity in Marx's viewpoint their significance is more than overcome by the brilliant combination of both gifted analysis of thought and stylistic synthesis.

When we distinguish the assessment of Marx's works around 1844 from that of the originality of his thought and of the momentum of his power of expression we can certainly find no reason to call this Marx an unfinished youth.

It seems to me to be rather the contrary, namely, that Marx reached his climax between 1843 and 1848 in regard to creative qualities. However highly one may esteem his later works they show some signs of inhibition and weakening of creative powers, which even the most heroic efforts did not always succeed in surmounting. The causes of this phenomenon are not hidden. They are partly to be found in his struggle against ill-health and material poverty--important handicaps especially for the head of a family, much more so than for a young married man in the ecstasy of the first years of married life. They are partly to be found also in the spite and bitterness arising after 1848 from the prophet's ever repeated disappointments, his time not yet having come.

However that may be and quite apart from one's judgment of the point whether or not his historical materialism of later days is to be seen as a "cover" for his humanistic philosophy of history--what essentially remains is the fact that in the *Manuscripts* and in a more extensive sense in his works between 1843 and 1846, Marx showed feelings and value-judgments that lie at the basis of the whole of his later works, including scientific ones, and that these feelings and judgments give these works their true significance. However one thinks about the conceptual basis of their formulation and about their place in historical materialism, these feelings and value-judgments do explain the motives from which Marx's Marxism has sprung, and thereby also explain its goals and its meaning. When this Marxism is not reified as a dogma or system but grasped as a living force, i.e., when it is neither severed from its origins in Marx's personality nor from the history of development of its changing configuration in relation to a constantly changing world that presents changing tasks, then the Marx of 1844 belongs to Marxism just as much as the Marx of 1867, or even more than the Engels of 1890.

That should be sufficient reason to make the publication of the *Manuscripts* (by way of crowning the availability of Marx's writings that were, until recently, largely unknown with respect to those between 1843 and 1846) a decisive impetus for socialist theory to address itself again to the question of its relationship to Marxism as a question of the relationship between Marx and Marxism.

As for myself, this new question seems most serious, since the main critical objections I have raised against "Marxism" do not apply to the Marx of the *Manuscripts*. Thus for me the problem also arises to what extent is it possible in criticizing current Marxism--which I judge objectively to be not very different from that of some six or seven years ago--to base oneself on the spiritual impetus found in Marx himself ?

If all that mattered were to be on the right side of a polemical dispute, I could easily say: so long as Marxism as practiced by its living theoreticians does not recognize this Marxist humanism and does not admit it into its way of thought, I hold to my reasons for preferring the slogan of the reformation of Marxism to that of its revision, and I refuse to have discussion of the objective need for this reformation changed into a scholastic debate over quotations from Marx as a diversion from confronting the essential tasks of the present day.

But neither do I have reason to conceal that my criticism of Marxism is based on a position which, in essential points, is the same as that of the humanistic Marx of the forties. I am even more willing to base this criticism on the same intention which later on induced Marx--or could have induced him--to say: *Moi, je ne suis pas marxiste*.

Whether he ever said this or not seems quite unimportant to me: for in reading his *Manuscripts* I felt as if he were saying it all the time. Therefore I feel my agreement with the Marx of 1844 not as an abandonment of my current position alongside (or, if you prefer, within) present-day Marxism but as a confirmation of this position.

All the rest is a matter of labels. Not that that is unimportant, for it is closely connected with shifts in emphasis that may be of great importance for theoretical exegesis as well as for practical application. But as that is not the subject-matter of the present treatise on Marx, I must hold it over for closer examination upon another occasion.

A.M. VAN PESKI

PERSPECTIVES DES ETUDES DEMANIENNES AUX PAYS-BAS

Pour comprendre les raisons du peu d'intérêt rencontré jusqu'ici par notre Association aux Pays-Bas, il faudrait entreprendre une analyse assez complète de l'évolution sociale et mentale récente dans ce pays singulier. Le temps me manque pour une telle analyse. Je me bornerai par conséquent à vous faire part de quelques remarques qui ne pourront évidemment pas prétendre avoir valeur de démonstration.

1. Pendant la troisième décennie de ce siècle, Henri de Man a exercé une influence considérable aux Pays-Bas. Que s'est-il donc passé pour qu'il en reste si peu de chose aujourd'hui ? La première réaction pendant et après la guerre était bien compréhensible : dans l'atmosphère d'épuration qui régnait alors, la réputation faite à de Man agissait nécessairement comme un vice rédhibitoire. Actuellement, on a en revanche l'impression que ce motif de rejet se perpétue surtout pour justifier une hostilité moins aisément avouable envers un homme que l'on accuse un peu rapidement et injustement d'être un "socialiste de droite". Pourquoi un tel qualificatif a-t-il un effet destructeur ? C'est ce que je voudrais tenter d'éclaircir.

Autant que je sache, le colloque qui a eu lieu à Genève en 1973 n'a suscité aux Pays-Bas qu'un seul article. Il a paru dans la revue mensuelle du Parti du Travail (socialiste) "Socialisme en Démocratie" et ne comportait qu'une demi-page. Il était totalement dépourvu de compréhension, notoirement incomplet, plein de préjugés et n'hésitait pas à ridiculiser toute l'entreprise en parlant de "vieux messieurs nostalgiques". En dépit de ses insuffisances, cet article était typique et révélateur d'une mentalité qui n'a malheureusement pas changé depuis lors.

2. Jetons maintenant un coup d'oeil au Parti socialiste, milieu où il semblerait naturel de discuter les idées d'Henri de Man. Que s'est-il passé là ?

Après la rupture avec le Parti catholique de l'époque, une longue période d'opposition mit graduellement fin à la phase constructive commencée après la guerre sous le premier ministre Drees. La révolution "provo" lui donna à partir de 1966 un nouvel élan. Des groupes plus radicaux se constituèrent et s'infiltrèrent dans le parti comme dans d'autres institutions. "Pourquoi avez-vous accepté un échec après l'autre ?" demandèrent-ils aux anciens cadres. "Vous n'avez pas osé changer les structures de la société". Cela devait aboutir au slogan avec lequel Den Uyl gagna les élections de 1973 et surtout celles de 1977 : nivellement de l'avoir, du savoir, du pouvoir.

3. Ce slogan illustre la revitalisation du sentiment social. Loin d'être satisfait et apaisé par l'évolution du welfare state, le sentiment qu'il exprimait se traduisit par des mesures entraînant un nivellement sensible des revenus. Le reste du slogan n'était, à mon sens, que fumée et brouillard, car le nivellement du savoir ne signifie pas autre chose qu'aveuglement face à l'abaissement qualitatif de l'éducation et de l'enseignement, déjà sapés par les tendances à la gestion et au contrôle autonomes des élèves et des étudiants, et plus généralement par l'esprit de facilité. Quant au nivellement du pouvoir, c'était une révérence gratuite à une illusion chère. En fait, le pouvoir centralisé n'a fait que s'accroître sous l'effet de la crise actuelle, surtout aux dépens de cet ennemi chimérique que sont les entreprises et leur rentabilité (déjà si pauvre...)

4. Ce dernier phénomène n'est que l'une des manifestations des conceptions sociales simplificatrices actuellement à la mode. Elles sont le fruit de la contribution "intellectuelle" des nouveaux cadres que sont devenus les jeunes gens à formation semi-scientifique vivant confortablement d'une situation acquise au sein des institutions universitaires ou scolaires, et disposant d'assez de loisirs pour exercer au surplus une activité de cadre dans le Parti. Ignorant l'histoire riche et variée du socialisme, influencés par les stéréotypes d'une pensée dont le simplisme aurait inquiété Marx, ils ont le sentiment d'être devenus des activistes mettant enfin en pratique le "marxisme". N'ayant que mépris pour la faiblesse des vieux dirigeants qu'ils s'efforcent de remplacer partout où cela est possible, n'obéissant qu'à peine aux dirigeants du parti plus sages mais moins audacieux qu'eux, ils ont profondément changé le contenu humain du mouvement socialiste. Comme par l'effet d'une suggestion massive et grâce à son infiltration effective dans les moyens de communication, le phénomène s'étend rapidement. Il n'est pas certain que cette description vaille pour la majorité du Parti socialiste, mais cette nouvelle vague exerce une fascination indéniable.

5. Ce simplisme pseudo-scientifique, dépourvu de sens critique et de mesure, a atteint son comble dans certaines universités et écoles sociales, où il équivaut souvent à une terreur mentale. Lorsque j'ai demandé à un ami de me désigner quelqu'un à la Faculté des sciences politiques de l'Université d'Amsterdam qui pourrait m'assister dans la préparation de ma conférence au colloque sur Henri de Man et les néo-marxistes, il me répondit : "Impossible. Dans cette faculté, on ne tolère que le marxisme pur ; tout ce qui s'en éloigne (par exemple un philosophe dissident comme Kolakowski) est considéré ici comme une chose morte"! *

* A part Amsterdam, c'est dans les universités précédemment catholiques de Nijmegen et de Tilburg que la radicalisation a été extrêmement rapide. Aux récentes élections, le Parti du travail a réalisé des gains énormes dans le sud catholique du pays.

Le manque de sens critique ainsi qu'un antiaméricanisme émotionnel dissimulent le blocage du vrai socialisme en URSS, de même que les contradictions du marxisme et de tous les courants de pensée nouveaux du type "small is beautiful", souci du milieu naturel, style de vie simple, etc.

6. Autrefois, de telles tendances étaient effectivement contrariées par le réalisme syndical. Aujourd'hui, on doit hélas constater que ce ressentiment et ces simplismes conceptuels ont également pénétré le mouvement syndical (socialiste et catholique, moins la section protestante). On vénère le "modèle conflictuel", on méprise le "modèle harmonique", ce qui se combine avec une technique efficace du pouvoir.

7. N'y a-t-il pas de réactions contre ces tendances ? Sans doute. * Mais les partis dissidents sont faibles. Les socialistes de droite (tels ceux rassemblés autour de Drees fils) ont à peu près disparu ; les cadres donnaient l'impression d'être d'incurables nostalgiques, leur chef était un homme aride et manquant de persuasion. Les autres se sont retirés dans une "émigration intérieure" et votent quelque part au centre, sans organisation.

8. En conclusion, on peut dire que le milieu favorable à l'étude de la pensée d'Henri de Man s'est appauvri sous l'influence du progressisme émotionnel sans racines dans l'histoire riche du socialisme hollandais et sans aucun sens critique, raison pour laquelle personne ne semble plus s'intéresser aux idées nées pendant les années 1920 et 1930, ni se demander si elles ont revêtu à l'époque ou revêtent aujourd'hui un caractère positif. Cette géné-

* On en a un exemple avec Bart Tromp et son ouvrage De Samenleving als oplichterij (La Société comme escroquerie) paru en 1977. Ce jeune sociologue, très intelligent, ruine toute la substance scientifique de la vague "marxiste" moderne.

ration, qui se sent très antifasciste, me paraît néanmoins faire preuve d'un fanatisme et d'une intolérance assez teutoniques. Elle dresse un barrage massif contre le socialisme de type pluraliste et relatif, fondé sur des mobiles positifs, comme l'était celui d'Henri de Man. Il suffit dès lors que celui-ci soit classé parmi les socialistes de droite réactionnaires pour qu'on se méfie de l'ensemble de ses idées et qu'on voie en lui une source possible de doute jeté sur le caractère salubre et exclusif du dogmatisme marxiste dernier cri.

9. Et les autres milieux? Je regarde avec une certaine envie du côté de la Belgique où un M. Tindemans ne craint pas d'être membre de notre Association. Aux Pays-Bas, les autres milieux politiques et culturels, en dehors de la séduction massive du "pop-Marxism", sont pauvrement équipés pour la discussion des idées. La meilleure chance réside encore dans les universités, quand arrivera la phase maintenant proche du dégrisement, là où un travail vraiment scientifique et responsable - dans le sens d'un engagement non fanatique - peut être stimulé par des scientifiques refusant l'endocritisme. La violence accrue de la vie sociale, comme on le voit notamment en Allemagne et en Italie, n'est pas de nature à nous rassurer. Mais il se peut que de ces chocs dangereux jaillisse un jour le désir d'une véritable alternative. C'est là que réside pour la pensée demanienne la possibilité d'un renouveau.

(Exposé présenté à l'assemblée générale de l'Association le 25 février 1978 à Amersfoort).

BULLETIN DU SECRETARIAT

ANCIEN ET NOUVEAU PRESIDENT

Le 25 février 1978 l'Association a tenu à Amersfoort (Pays-Bas) son assemblée générale ordinaire, qui a eu notamment pour tâche de réélire le comité et d'assurer la difficile succession de notre président, Monsieur Jef RENS, lequel avait décliné une réélection en préconisant le rajeunissement des cadres de l'Association. Le président sortant, dont le dynamisme fut et reste pour nous un exemple et un sujet d'admiration, était en fonction depuis la création de l'Association en 1973. L'ayant tenue sur les fonts baptismaux, il lui a apporté pendant ses deux mandats successifs un appui efficace et chaleureux. Nous lui en exprimons ici notre vive reconnaissance. Notre ancien président reste membre du comité.

L'assemblée générale de l'Association a choisi son successeur en la personne du Dr. Adriaan M. VAN PESKI (Leiden, Pays-Bas), membre fondateur lui aussi, fin connaisseur de la pensée d'Henri de Man (cf. son livre *Hendrik de Man* paru aux éditions Desclée De Brouwer, Bruges/Utrecht, 1969), animateur dévoué et compétent de nos réunions. Le nouveau président est conscient des difficultés de sa tâche. Il s'en explique dans le message qui ouvre ce Bulletin et dans l'exposé qu'il fit à Amersfoort sur les perspectives des études demanienues aux Pays-Bas, exposé également reproduit dans ce numéro. C'est en tout cas avec plaisir que nous lui apporterons le soutien qu'il attend. Bienvenue donc à notre nouveau président.

L'assemblée générale a d'autre part procédé à l'élection du comité. Elle a réélu le comité sortant et lui a adjoint un nouveau membre en la personne de Monsieur Piet TOMMISSEN (Bruxelles), auteur entre autres de diverses études sur Henri de Man, dont deux ont paru dans notre Bulletin. Le nouveau comité a confirmé Peter DODGE dans ses fonctions de vice-président et Michel BRELAZ dans celles de secrétaire général. La composition du comité est donc la suivante :

Madame et Messieurs Adriaan M. VAN PESKI (Pays-Bas), président;
Peter DODGE (Etats-Unis), vice-président; Michel BRELAZ (Suisse), secrétaire général; Herman BALTHAZAR (Belgique), Artur E. BRATU (Allemagne fédérale),

Henri BRUGMANS (Pays-Bas), Juliaan CAPELLE (Belgique), Jan-H. DE MAN (Belgique), Pieter DE BUYSER (Belgique), Madeleine GRAWITZ (France), Georges LEFRANC (France), Maurice NAESSENS (Belgique), Ivo RENS (Suisse), Jef RENS (Belgique), Piet TOMMISSEN (Belgique), membres.

COTISATIONS

Comme vous le savez, l'exercice annuel de l'Association coïncide avec l'année académique. L'exercice 1977-78 est donc terminé et l'exercice 1978-79 a commencé.

Le secrétariat vous serait reconnaissant de songer au paiement de votre cotisation, si vous ne l'avez pas déjà fait. Il adresse un appel particulier aux retardataires qui n'ont pas réglé leur cotisation écoulée. Si vous êtes dans le doute, il vous communiquera volontiers la situation de votre compte. D'avance, merci de votre compréhension.

Les paiements peuvent être faits à l'Association pour l'étude de l'oeuvre d'Henri de Man :

---COMPTE BANCAIRE No A 7.752.516 auprès de la CAISSE D'EPARGNE, GENEVE

---COMPTE DE CHEQUES POSTAUX No 12 - 2000 (Genève) de la CAISSE D'EPARGNE, GENEVE, avec mention du destinataire sur le coupon.

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A PARAÎTRE, JANVIER 1979

à PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY, 08540, U.S.A.

**A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF HENDRIK DE MAN,
SOCIALIST CRITIC OF MARXISM.**

EDITED BY PETER DODGE

Prix indicatif : \$ 22.50 relié
\$ 9.75 broché

Voir page suivante.

A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF HENDRIK DE MAN,
SOCIALIST CRITIC OF MARXISM
Edited by Peter Dodge

In this collection of excerpts from the essential works of Hendrik de Man (1885-1953), Peter Dodge resurrects a place in historical consciousness for this pioneer sociologist of the European socialist movement and of labor in industrial society. Before World War II regarded as pre-eminent among socialist theoreticians--comparable to Marx himself, de Man's political legitimacy was obliterated by his equivocal neutralist stance during the Occupation of his native Belgium. Yet de Man's insistence upon the essentially voluntaristic, ethical springs to human conduct (including those of the struggling proletariat); his charge of Marxist responsibility for the historical inefficacy of the socialist movement whether as impotent Western reformism or as extremist Soviet totalitarianism; and his sensitivity to the difference between bureaucratic nationalization and effective socialization, may be as relevant today as they were in early twentieth-century Europe.

While largely accepting the Marxist mode of the analysis of capitalism, de Man also drew attention to the ways in which the capitalist order had evolved in ways that Marx had not foreseen. His entire life was accordingly devoted to the cause of regalanizing the socialist movement in the face of the unacknowledged collapse of chiliastic expectations that a socialist society would be ensured by the political triumph of the proletariat.

Selecting from the seventeen books, forty-odd brochures, and some four hundred articles that comprise de Man's works, the editor chooses those passages that are of primary significance for de Man's contribution to social analysis and for the elucidation of his intellectual development. In addition to explanatory headnotes and an Introduction to de Man's life, the volume contains a selective bibliography and primary and secondary material.

Peter Dodge is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of New Hampshire.

PUBLICATIONS DISPONIBLES

Henri de Man, *L'Idée socialiste*, Genève, 1974, 542 pages. Fr.s. 30.-.

Henri de Man, *Au delà du marxisme*, Paris, 1973, 439 pages. Fr.s. 15.-.

Actes du Colloque international sur l'œuvre d'Henri de Man, Genève, 1973, 3 volumes multicotiés, 305 pages. Fr.s. 10.- les trois volumes (gratuits pour les membres de l'Association).

Les prix s'entendent port compris.

OFFRE SPECIALE pour les membres de l'Association :

Tout membre de l'Association, ancien ou nouveau, à jour de ses cotisations, recevra gratuitement sur demande un exemplaire de L'Idée socialiste ou de Au delà du marxisme. Prière d'indiquer le titre choisi au moment d'effectuer le paiement de la cotisation ou en écrivant au secrétariat. Pour les membres nouveaux, cette offre est limitée à l'année académique en cours.

L'ASSOCIATION POUR L'ETUDE DE L'OEUVRE D'HENRI DE MAN est une association scientifique et culturelle sans but lucratif. Elle se propose d'encourager l'étude objective de l'œuvre d'Henri de Man, ainsi que la recherche historique sur sa genèse, son évolution et son influence, et, d'une façon plus générale, de faire connaître ce qui, dans cette œuvre, présente un intérêt pour la solution des problèmes politiques, économiques, sociaux et culturels actuels.

DEMANDEZ VOTRE ADHESION. Sur simple demande adressée au secrétariat, nous vous enverrons les statuts de l'Association, en français, néerlandais, allemand, anglais (précisez, s.v.p.).

L'ASSOCIATION sollicite votre collaboration pour retrouver, recenser, préserver documents, livres, journaux, photos, etc. relatifs à Henri de Man. Collaborez à son Bulletin. Soutenez-la. Elle vous informe : Informez-la.

PIET TOMMISSEN : A PROPOS D'UNE BIOGRAPHIE D'HENRI DE MAN (II)

in BULLETIN No 7. - Février 1978, pages 21 - 33

E R R A T A

Une lettre s'étant égarée, des fautes dactylographiques et des lacunes ont malheureusement subsisté dans le texte de M. Tommissen, qui n'y est évidemment pour rien. Le lecteur voudra bien nous en excuser et tenir compte des corrections suivantes, s'il n'a pas déjà reçu par ailleurs avec le Bulletin No 7 la feuille rose contenant ces corrections (Réd.)

- p. 22 - point 2
(in fine) compléter la phrase comme suit : ... ou, à la rigueur, la démystification opérée par le communiste français Georges Politzer (1903-1942)¹²
- p. 23 - point 4
(23^e ligne) au lieu de conte rendu, lire : compte rendu
- p. 25 - point 7
(9^e ligne) au lieu de Elanor, lire : Eleanor
- p. 28 - note 3 compléter la note comme suit : ... p. 281. L'avis de M. Lourau est d'autant plus étrange qu'Eastman s'est ouvertement distancé des thèses d'Henri de Man. Cf. son ouvrage remarquable La science de la révolution, Paris : Gallimard, 1927, 296 p., n° 35 dans "Les documents bleus"; surtout pp. 280-282.
- p. 28 - note 4 au lieu de (°1895), lire : (°1903)
- p. 29 - note 8a compléter comme suit : ... inchangée (1972)
- p. 31 - note 36 compléter comme suit : ... cf. p. 114. Il existe une traduction française (1977)
- p. 32 - note 43 lire la dernière phrase comme suit : Cet auteur cite la thèse de droit de Jean Djordjevitch : Les rapports entre la notion d'Etat et la notion de classes sociales, Paris : Rodstein, 1933, 422 p.; cf. pp. 88-89.
- p. 32 : note 43a lire la dernière phrase comme suit : Mais aussi la réfutation assez faible et de toute manière peu convaincante de ces auteurs par...

A TOUS LES MEMBRES DE L'ASSOCIATION ET AUX LECTEURS DU BULLETIN.....

HEUREUX NOEL ET BONNE ANNEE

